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I. INTRODUCTION
In Florida, it is a third degree felony, punishable by up to five years
imprisonment,' for a private party to tape a private conversation unless all
participants consent.2 Any tape made without the consent of all participants
is inadmissible.3 Anthony Paul Inciarrano least expected that Earvin Herman
Trimble was taping Inciarrano when Inciarrano shot Trimble to death in
Trimble's office on July 7, 1982.4 Because the tape was the only evidence of
the murder, the Florida courts were forced to decide whether they would
apply the plain language of the Florida statutes or allow a cold-blooded
murderer to go free.
Trimble had once been extremely successful in the real estate business
in Riverside, California. Apparently, Trimble began losing profits from the
business, and customers' down payments, gambling on the horse races. In
1979, when he was about to stand trial for thirteen counts of grand theft,
Trimble left California for Florida and changed his name to Michael A.
Phillips. First he became Reverend Phillips, a minister of the First Church
of Utilitarian Science, whose mail order church sponsored a bingo parlor.
Then, under phony credentials, he opened an office in Fort Lauderdale,
Florida and practiced psychology as Dr. Michael A. Phillips.
5
Inciarrano's bingo hall in Oakland Park, Florida, had been closed down
by the police. Phillips met Inciarrano in 1982 through a newspaper ad and
they struck a deal for Inciarrano to invest $7000 and become a partner with
Phillips in the bingo business. Later, Phillips decided not to go into business
with Inciarrano. Inciarrano and Phillips argued about their business deal on
July 1, 1982, in Phillips' office. Phillips tape recorded the conversation by
hiding a microphone in a pencil holder, with the microphone connected by
wire to a tape recorder in a desk drawer.
6
1. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1995).
2. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1995).
3. See id. § 934.03, .06 (1995). Section 934.10 would have allowed Inciarrano to recover
statutory and punitive damages as well as attorney's fees and costs. FLA. STAT. § 934.10
(1995).
4. Barry Bearak, Court to Consider Privacy Issue; Victim Taped His Murder but Slayer
May Be Freed, L.A.TIMEs, Jan. 13, 1985, at 1.
5. Id.; Brian Dickerson, Murder Tape is Allowed as Evidence, NAT'L L.J., July 22, 1985,
at 5.
6. Bearak, supra note 4, at 1.
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On July 6, 1982, Inciarrano went to Phillips' office and they argued
again, with the tape recorder running.7 The tape caught Inciarrano yelling,
"[w]e have a deal, yes or no?"'8 Then Inciarrano cocked his gun and fired
five times at Phillips. Phillips groaned and fell to the floor beside his desk.9
At approximately 3:30 to 3:40 p.m., a neighbor heard gunshots and called
the police.10 The police found Phillips' body, the tape recorder, and the tape.
The tape was the sole piece of evidence against Inciarrano. "Nobody saw
Inciarrano go in; nobody saw him go out.... The murder weapon was never
discovered. There were no fingerprints."" Inciarrano claimed that he had
the right to have the tape suppressed because it had been obtained illegally,
even though he admitted it was his voice on the tape.12 He based his claim
on the Florida statute, 13 which allows tape recording of an "oral communica-
tion" only if all parties to the communication consent. As more fully
explained in Part III of this article, the Florida courts struggled with this
dilemma until the Supreme Court of Florida created a case law exception to
the Florida law to keep Inciarrano in jail.l14
This article examines how the Florida courts have interpreted the two
party consent requirement of the Florida Security of Communications Act.'
5
It concludes that because there are many legitimate reasons for a participant
in a conversation to tape the conversation, the action should not carry civil
and criminal penalties, and the tape should not be inadmissible because of
the interception alone. If it benefits anyone, the two party consent require-
ment benefits the criminal element. Accordingly, this article argues that the
Florida Act should be amended to allow taping upon the consent of one party
to the conversation.
Part II of this article illustrates the many reasons for intercepting
conversations. Part HI examines selected provisions of the Omnibus Crime
7. Id.
8. Barry Bearak, Conviction Upheld in Illegally Recorded Murder, L.A. TIMES, June 28,
1985, at 22.
9. Dickerson, supra note 5, at 5.
10. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 387 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed, 473
So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985); Privacy for a Murder, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 1985, at A20.
11. Statement of the prosecutor, Richard T. Garfield; Bearak, supra note 4, at 1.
12. FLA. STAT. § 934.09(9)(a) (1995); Dickerson, supra note 5, at 5.
13. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
14. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1273.
15. Chapter 934, Florida Statutes is entitled "Security of Communications," and is com-
monly referred to as the Security of Communications Act. Sections 934.01-.10 of this Act
will hereinafter be referred to as the "Florida Act."
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Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,16 as amended, 7 and selected decisions
of the United States Supreme Court to provide background for the balance of
the article. Part IV analyzes the Florida Act, and Part V evaluates the
privacy provisions of the Florida Constitution. Finally, Part VI explains
how the two party consent requirement is irrational.
11. WHAT IS THE REASON FOR TAPING?
The reasons for taping or intercepting conversations are many, ranging
from blackmail or causing embarrassment, to entertainment, satisfaction of
one's prurient interest, gathering information, gathering evidence of a crime
or tort, improving workplace security or efficiency, to gathering evidence to
use in divorce cases, as well as industrial espionage. In addition, some
interception may be inadvertent. Still, some reasons for intercepting conver-
sations are more legitimate than others.
The legitimate reasons include gathering information (possibly to later
defend oneself) and gathering evidence of a crime or tort. At the other
extreme, certain reasons for taping, such as blackmail and industrial espio-
nage, are crimes or torts, even aside from the Florida Act. The argument
made more fully in Part VI of this article is that the legitimate reasons for
taping should not carry criminal and civil consequences, especially given the
pervasiveness of taping.
Although illegal in Florida, if done by a private party,18 intercepting
conversations is pervasive, as shown by the following examples. The
examples involve either nationally known personalities or interceptions in
Florida. Some were collected from newspaper articles and others from
reported cases.
A. To Blackmail or Embarrass
Politics is rife with taping. Politicians are either taping or being taped.
While President Nixon taped conversations in the oval office, Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson tape recorded conversations as well. President
16. Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 82, STAT. 197 (1968) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-22
(1994)).
17. The 1968 Act was amended by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
and by the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The 1968 Act as
amended by the 1986 and the 1994 Acts shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Federal Act."
18. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d). This statute requires all participants to consent to the
taping. However, section 934.03(2)(c) of the Florida Statutes, allows a police informant who
is a party to a conversation to intercept the conversation. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c).
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Kennedy could press a button under the cabinet table to tape record meetings
or press a button for his secretary to record telephone calls he selected. The
"selected" taping totaled 248 hours of meetings and twelve hours of tele-
phone calls. 19 Gennifer Flowers tape recorded President Clinton "during
four separate telephone conversations from December, 1990, when Clinton
had just won reelection as governor, to December, 1991, the early weeks of
the presidential campaign," 20 and later sold copies of the tapes for $19.95.21
Ross Perot telephoned Colonel Oliver North and offered assistance, all the
while taping the call.22 HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros almost lost his job
when Linda Medlar, with whom Cisneros had an affair, made available tapes
of conversations between herself and Cisneros.23 Medlar had taped their
conversations over a period of almost four years. 24
B. To Entertain or to Satisfy One's Prurient Interest
Some people seem to enjoy learning private details of someone else's
life. The private details are surreptitiously taped or listened to either to
entertain or to satisfy one's prurient interest. According to a recent Liz
Taylor biographer, Liz's third husband, Michael Todd, taped the sounds of
19. William Safire, Kennedy's Betrayal of Trust - 260 Hours Worth of Tapes, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1994, at Al1. Mr. Safire comments:
Hundreds of people who spoke to the [P]resident with the reasonable expectation
of privacy were betrayed. And a nation that was dismayed and infuriated at the
revelation of the Nixon taping system in 1973 can see today where that sleazy
business began in earnest: in 1962, at the personal direction of John Fitzgerald
Kennedy.
Id.
20. William C. Rempel, Flowers to Market Tapes of Conversations with Clinton, L.A.
TIMES, May 24, 1994, at A18.
21. Id.
22. William Safire, Will Phone Taps for 'Protection' Turn Us Into a Nation of Spies?,
CHI. TRm., Nov. 13, 1992, at C19.
23. Cisneros to Remain, Fight Probe, ORLANDo SENT., Mar. 15, 1995, at Al, A4.
24. Excerpt from Reno's Letter on Cisneros, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at B9.
The tapes, secretly recorded by Ms. Medlar over four years, showed that he had
discussed payments to her that were higher than Mr. Cisneros had publicly ac-
knowledged he had paid. In addition, the tapes indicated he had continued pay-
ing her after he joined the Cabinet in early 1993, which he had publicly denied.
David Johnston, Concluding that Cisneros Lied, Reno Urges a Special Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1995, at Al.
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he and Liz making love, "complete with 'fervid moaning and groaning, '' 5
and made copies of the tape for his friends.
26
In the 1980s, Anthony LaPorte was convicted of five felony counts
under the Florida Act.27 La Porte videotaped models in "modeling-video"
sessions involving several changes of clothing. When LaPorte left the room
to allow the models to change, he left the video camera running. The
resulting videos captured what the models were saying as they undressed and
dressed.2
Newspaper articles from January and February of 1995, chronicle a
number of such instances. In January 1995, an Orlando, Florida, couple
were charged with kidnapping and interception of oral communications,
among other charges. They apparently had a practice of finding single
women in a parking lot of a local nightclub, propositioning the women, and
taking them home. On one occasion, the "thrill-seeking couple kidnapped a
woman from a nightclub ... and forced her to perform sex acts for seven
hours while two children slept nearby.... At one point, they took a break so
that [the female thrill-seeker] could drive to her mother's house and get a
tape recorder to make an audio recording of the event.'29
In January of 1995, in St. Petersburg, Florida, a suspected rapist was
arrested. Police found some twenty tapes at the rapist's home. The alleged
rape assault for which the arrest was made was recorded on one videotape
with the victim saying, "'[n]o, don't do that. I don't want this to happen. ' ' 30
Apparently, the same videotape shows the rape of another woman.
31
In February of 1995, an Orlando area man pleaded no contest to
unlawful interception of oral communication. The communications occurred
at Walt Disney World's Epcot Center. The man "would angle a video
camera under the restroom stall to catch women disrobing and using the
facilities. 32 Also in February 1995, a man was looking for a television cable
25. Bio Paints a Lurid Portrait of a Boozy, Pill-popping Liz, ORLANDO SENT., Apr. 11,
1995, at A2.
26. Id.
27. LaPorte v. State, 512 So. 2d 984, 985 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1987), review denied,
519 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1988).
28. Id. at 986. LaPorte was convicted of interception of oral communications. Id. at 985.
29. Tom Leithauser, Couple Charged with Rape, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 7, 1995, at DI,
D4.
30. Suspect's Video has a Surprise, ORLANDO SENT., Jan. 17, 1995, at C3.
31. Id.
32. Man Who Taped Women in Restroom Gets Probation, ORLANDO SENT., Feb. 8, 1995,
at C3.
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in the attic above an adjoining apartment. The man had crossed through a
hole in the fire wall separating the attic above his apartment from the attic
above his neighbors' apartment. Once above the neighbors' apartment, the
man allegedly disconnected an air conditioning duct and "stole a peek ... at
[the] two neighbors having sex. 33
C. To Gather Information
With today's litigious atmosphere, how would you defend yourself
against charges of sexual harassment or other types of impropriety? A tape
might be vital where the testimony of witnesses are so conflicting that you
know someone is lying. What would have happened if Clarence Thomas or
Anita Hill had taped their conversations? A damaging tape would have kept
him off the United States Supreme Court. If he had taped a particular
conversation that she testified to in detail, he could use the tape to impeach
her credibility. A tape of a conversation is often much more accurate than
someone testifying as to that person's recollection of what happened. In
Florida, you could serve up to five years in prison3 4 if you tape a conversa-
tion without the other person's consent, 35 even though it may be the only
means of gathering information or later defending yourself.
Scott Bentley was a star place kicker for the Florida State University
("FSU") football team and "kicked four field goals, including a game-
winning 22-yarder, in FSU's national championship victory over Nebraska in
the Jan. 1[, 1994] Orange Bowl. 3 6 Bentley, who is from Colorado, had seen
his father tape conversations in Colorado when he wanted to protect himself.
Bentley and his father talked about protecting oneself from charges of date
rape. The father said, [in Tallahassee,] "Florida State is the focus of every-
thing. You can be a target. If someone accuses you, how do you defend
yourself? I've really talked to Scotty a lot about date-rape over the past
couple of years. 37  Scott Bentley had a three week relationship with a
Florida A&M pre-nursing student, which he described as a "one-night stand,
33. Intruder Accused of Trying to Watch Neighbors in Bed, ORLANDO SENT., Feb. 9,
1995, at C3.
34. Under section 775.082(3)(d), a third degree felony is punishable by up to five years
imprisonment. FLA. STAT. § 775.082(3)(d) (1995).
35. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
36. Alan Schmadtke, FSU's Bentley Fined, Penalized in Sex Tape Case, FT. LAUD. SUN
SENT., May 17, 1994, at IC.
37. Clay Latimer & Curtis Eichelberger, Rogers Ready to Step it Up; Nuggets Rookie
Knows Team Needs Him to Have Big Game; Bentley Sentenced for Illegal Recording, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 17, 1994, at 6B.
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basically," 38 at her apartment in February of 1994, near the end of the
relationship. Scott Bentley taped the consensual sexual activity and later
played the tape to two other football players and a friend. The woman
pressed charges under the Florida statute, which prohibits taping without the
prior consent of all parties. 39 After admitting he made the tape, Bentley
pleaded no contest to a misdemeanor charge and was sentenced to forty
hours community service and a $500 fine. He was also ordered to pay $150
in court costs and was placed on probation for six months. Scott Bentley
stated, "the crime was to protect myself. What I did is legal in 48 states. If I
had known it was illegal, I would never have done it.... I wanted to protect
myself from date rape or potential allegations by her."'4
The Florida Act also limits the media's ability to gather information. In
a 1977 case, the media challenged the constitutionality of the Florida Act. In
Shevin v. Sunbeam Television Corporation,41 a television station and the
Miami Herald challenged the Florida Act requirement of obtaining consent
of all participants to tape a conversation. The news media claimed that the
provision "impaired its news gathering dissemination activities and consti-
tuted a prior restraint in violation of the First Amendment,"42 alleging that
"three basic elements ... necessitate the use of concealed recording equip-
ment in investigative reporting: accuracy; candidness of person interviewed;
and corroboration. 43 Investigation of "consumer fraud, housing discrimina-
tion, illegal abortion, [and] corruption of officials," among other topics,
would be substantially impaired without the ability to make concealed
recordings. 44 The Supreme Court of Florida held that the Florida Security of
Communications Act was constitutional because the Act did not restrict what
the news media could publish.45
D. To Gather Evidence of a Crime or a Tort
The Florida Act has become a ready tool of law enforcement, allowing
officers to gather evidence of a crime. After detaining someone, a police
officer might find the need to investigate further or to search a vehicle.
38. Scott Tolley, Bentley Sentenced for Tape Recording, PALM BCH. POST, May 17, 1994,
at IC.
39. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
40. Tolley, supra note 38, at 1C.
41. 351 So. 2d 723, 725 (Fla. 1977).
42. Id. at 725.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 726-27.
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Although not under arrest, the officer may suggest that the detainee sit in the
back seat of the patrol car for the individual's "safety" or "convenience."
And, of course, after arrest, the arrested individual is placed in the back seat
of the patrol car for transportation to the police station. While the individual
is in the patrol car, the officer may have a tape recorder running, in hopes
that the tape will intercept useful information or incriminating statements.
One Florida court considered the following pre-arrest scenario:
Some time after the police stopped the vehicle in which appellant
traveled with two other males, the officer asked the driver if he
could search the vehicle. When the driver consented to the search,
the officer asked the driver and two passengers, one being appel-
lant, if they would sit in the patrol car while he searched the vehi-
cle. According to the officer, he advised these individuals that they
did not have to sit in the police vehicle and that they were free to
leave if they so desired. The officer admitted that he requested
they sit in the patrol car because he wanted to tape record their
conversations. The officer's search revealed no contraband, and
the officer sent the three men on their way. When the officer lis-
tened to the tape recorded conversation, however, he heard one of
the males tell the others that the contraband was in his shoe. The
officer then radioed this information to the Okeechobee Sheriff's
Office and that department later apprehended the three males.4
6
When the Supreme Court of Florida considered a similar pre-arrest situation,
it applied article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution47 and held that "a
person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a police car and
... any statements intercepted therein may be admissible as evidence. 48
Thus, because a person in a police car has no expectation of privacy in a
police car, any communication made in a police car would not be protected
by the Florida Act.
In June 1991, a Sarasota police detective obtained a court order allow-
ing detectives to monitor numbers called into Roberta Jackson's display
pager. The detectives intercepted the numbers by using a duplicate pager.
Thus, when numbers were displayed on Jackson's pager, they were also
46. Barrett v. State, 618 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), cause dismissed,
623 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1993). The fourth district ruled that the tape recording should have been
suppressed. Id. at 270. However, Barrett is no longer good law. See also State v. Smith, 641
So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 1994).
47. See infra notes 144, 153 and accompanying text.
48. Smith, 641 So. 2d at 852.
Bast
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displayed on the detectives' pager. "[T]he numbers included a two- or three-
digit code that identified the caller, the caller's telephone number, and the
amount of drugs the caller wanted to purchase from Jackson., 49  After
conducting visual surveillance of Jackson in her car, the police searched her
car pursuant to a search warrant and arrested Jackson after they found
cocaine. In appealing her conviction, Jackson argued that the interception of
numbers on the display pager was unconstitutional because the court order
had been obtained without following the stringent wiretap procedures of the
Florida Act.50 The Supreme Court of Florida held that a wiretap order
involving a display pager must follow the wiretap procedure of the Florida
Act.51 The court noted, "because the interception of a pager may disclose
telephone numbers and coded messages as dialed by the caller, monitoring a
pager with a duplicate digital display pager is more intrusive than using a
pen register or a trap-and-trace device. 52
In early 1995, a would-be hit man and police informant, Peter Laquerre,
recorded conversations between himself and a Florida State University
second year law school student, Joann Plachy. Plachy claimed a professor
made unwanted sexual advances. A few days later a law school secretary
accused Plachy of stealing a copy of a law school exam before it was given.
Plachy allegedly called Laquerre to hire him to kill the secretary. Plachy
stated:
If I don't take this person out of the picture, I'm just screwed....
I'm looking at losing my whole law career, and I'm just about a
straight-A student.... I cannot emphasize how very important it is.
It must look like a total accident.... I'm talking about a situation
like, say, something like there's a one-car accident; the car leaves
the road and hits a tree or whatever, and the driver has a broken
neck.
53
Plachy was arrested on February 20, 1995, and charged with the murder-for-
hire scheme.54 As more fully explained in Part III of this article, Laquerre's
49. State v. Jackson, 650 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1995).
50. Id. at 26.
51. Id. at28.
52. Id.
53. Jack Wheaton & Mark Silva, Student Wanted to Murder School Snitch, Police Say,
Tims PICAYuNE, Feb. 22, 1995, at A9.
54. Sharon Rauch, A Law Degree to Kill For, TALL. DEM., Feb. 21, 1995, at 1A.
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tape would not run afoul of the Florida Act because Laquerre was a police
informant.
E. To Improve the Workplace
Apparently, many employers eavesdrop on employees. In a 1993
survey conducted by Macworld Magazine, more than twenty-one percent of
the 301 businesses surveyed "engaged in searches of employee computer
files, voice mail, electronic mail, or other networking communications."
55
These searches were primarily conducted to monitor work flow, investigate
thefts, or investigate espionage. 6 An exception to the wiretap statutes
allows employers to tap phone and data lines. The exception applies if the
"subscriber or user" of the electronic communication service intercepts
communications "in the ordinary course of its business. ' 7
A recent example of employer eavesdropping that made headlines
occurred in North Miami Beach. A North Miami Beach bank supervisor
monitored telephone conversations of employees at the bank. The supervi-
sor allegedly overheard a conversation between William McCarthy, a bank
employee, and a potential customer. McCarthy claims that the supervisor
"accused him [McCarthy] of trying to steer a prospective loan customer to a
competitor," fired McCarthy when he refused to disclose the potential loan
customer's name, and "challenged McCarthy's application for unemploy-
,,58
ment compensation.
55. Survey Shows Snooping By Employers Widespread: Millions in the U.S. May Be
Subject to Electronic Monitoring on the Job, a Magazine Reports, ORLANDO SENT., May 23,
1993, at A13.
56. Id
57. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(4)(a)(1) (1995). The business exception was the key in two
Florida murder cases. In the two cases, the victims had received calls from the alleged
murders while at work, the conversations were monitored on extension phones, and the
victims were murdered shortly after the calls. The issue in each case was whether the
testimony of the eavesdropper was admissible. State v. Nova, 361 So. 2d 411, 412-13 (Fla.
1978); Horn v. State, 298 So. 2d 194, 196 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 308 So.
2d 117 (Fla. 1975). In Nova, the testimony of the eavesdropper, the victim's supervisor, was
held admissible because an earlier call had left the victim "visibly upset," and the supervisor
monitored the second call as the victim's supervisor. Nova, 361 So. 2d at 413. In Horn, the
court found that a co-worker had monitored the victim's call out of curiosity and the co-
worker's testimony was therefore inadmissible. Horn, 298 So. 2d at 198-99.
The Federal Act contains the same exception. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a) (1994).
58. Ex-worker Says Boss Bugged Telephone and Then Fired Him, ORLANDO SENT., Jan.
4, 1995, at D5.
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F. To Use in Domestic Disputes
The temptation is great for one spouse to tape the other spouse when the
spouses are separated or contemplating divorce. In addition, access makes
the installation of an eavesdropping device relatively easy. Considering the
Federal Act, courts have split, some holding that the Federal Act covers
interspousal taping and others holding that the Federal Act is not applicable
to interspousal taping.59
In two cases, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that the Florida Act
is applicable to interspousal taping. In the first decision, the court ruled that
a tape made surreptitiously by one spouse is inadmissible and that one
spouse may recover civil damages against the other spouse who surrepti-
tiously recorded a telephone conversation. In Markham v. Markham,60 the
Markhams had two telephone lines in their home. The first line was listed in
Thomas Markham's name, and the second line was an extension of a line
installed at the Nancy Markham School of Dance several blocks away.
Thomas, a recording engineer, attached a tape recorder to the two lines and
intercepted a number of telephone calls. Thomas offered several of the
taped conversations into evidence in the Markhams' dissolution of marriage
action.61 The Supreme Court of Florida noted that the Florida Act contains
no exception for domestic relations cases and affirmed the district court's
decision holding the tapes inadmissible.
62
In the second case, Mr. and Mrs. Burgess had separated when "Mr.
Burgess stole into the family home, climbed into the attic, and spliced an
electronic device onto the telephone lines in an effort to intercept and record
Mrs. Burgess' telephone conversations. He then played these recordings to
neighbors and used them for purposes of gaining an advantage for himself in
the dissolution proceedings." 63 The court held "that the doctrine of inter-
spousal tort immunity does not bar a civil cause of action for money dam-
ages brought by one spouse against the other under section 934. 10." 4
59. Jonathan Niemeyer, All in the Family: Interspousal and Parental Wiretapping Under
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act, 81 KY. L.J. 237, 253 (1992-93); Coi D. Stephens, Note:
All's Fair: No Remedy Under Title Ill for Interspousal Surveillance, 57 FORDHAM L. REV.
1035, 1037 (1989).
60. 265 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972), af'd, 272 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1973).
61. Id. at 60.
62. Markham, 272 So. 2d at 814.
63. Burgess v. Burgess, 447 So. 2d 220, 221 (Fla. 1984).
64. Id. at 223.
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G. To Learn a Competitor's Secrets
Federal law makes it a crime to manufacture "any electronic, mechani-
cal, or other device, knowing or having reason to know that the design of
such device renders it primarily useful for the purpose of the surreptitious
interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications." 65 Even so, "spy
shops" in a number of cities had been selling illegal "bugs" useful in
industrial espionage. A sixteen month investigation ended on April 5, 1995,
with United Stated Customs Service agents raiding spy shops in twenty-four
cities across the country. Some of the bugs seized were radio transmitters
concealed in pens, calculators, light sockets, telephone jacks, and electric
power strips. In addition, some of the bugs could "pick up conversations and
transmit them more than a mile away to a receiver the size of a pack of
cigarettes." 66
H. Inadvertent Interception
Conversations may be picked up over an AM/FM radio or short wave
radio inadvertently. In one Florida case, John Sion, who lived in a tenth
floor apartment near Picciolo's Restaurant, woke up one morning at 2:50
a.m., switched on his ham radio receiver, and began reading a book. When
he heard a conversation over the radio that seemed to concern a robbery, he
began taping it. What he had intercepted was a walkie talkie conversation
between officers Chandler and Granger of the Miami Beach Police Depart-
ment.67 When Picciolo's Restaurant opened for business on May 23, 1977,
one of the cooks discovered that the floor safe was empty. Even though
Granger was not working the May 22, 1977, 11:00 p.m. to 9:00 a.m. shift,
another officer testified that he saw Granger at approximately 3:00 a.m. on
May 23, 1977, driving a marked police car. Chandler claimed that he and
Granger "staged a bogus burglary on the air as a part of a wager to see
whether anyone was listening.' 68 The court held that the Florida Act did not
prohibit the interception because walkie talkie radio signals did not come
65. 18 U.S.C. § 2512(1)(b) (1994).
66. James C. McKinley, Jr., U.S. Agents Raid Stores in 24 Cities to Seize Spy Gear, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 6, 1995, at Al, B12; John Lantigua, The Bug Stops Here: Raids Hit Spy Shops,
MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 6, 1995, at 1A, 10A.
67. Chandler v. State, 366 So. 2d 64, 66, 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
376 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
68. Id. at 66-67, 70.
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within the Act, and because Chandler and Granger claimed to be staging a
"bogus burglary," they had no reasonable expectation of privacy.
69
III. EAVESDROPPING: SELECTED UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
CASES AND THE FEDERAL ACT
The 1967 United States Supreme Court opinion, Katz v. United States ,
is the seminal privacy decision of this half of the century. In Katz, FBI
agents suspected that Charles Katz was telephoning gambling information to
persons in other states, in violation of federal law. Based upon visual
surveillance, the agents predicted that Katz would use a public telephone
booth to make the calls at approximately the same time each morning. The
agents attached an electronic listening and recording device to the outside of
the telephone booth and recorded six conversations, approximately three
minutes long. During the conversations, Katz was visible through the glass
panels of the telephone booth. The tapes were admitted at trial, and Katz
was convicted.7'
The issue in the United States Supreme Court was "whether the search
and seizure conducted in this case complied with constitutional standards. ' 2
The Court held that "[t]he Government's activities in electronically listening
to and recording [Katz's] words violated the privacy upon which he justifia-
bly relied while using the telephone booth and thus constituted a 'search and
seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 73  The Court
reasoned,
the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may
be constitutionally protected.... No less than an individual in a
business office, in a friend's apartment, or in a taxicab, a person in
69. Id. at 70. At the time the case was decided, the Florida Act only covered those wire
communications transmitted by "wire, cable, or other like connection." Id. The Florida Act
was subsequently amended to include protection for radio communications as an "electronic
communication" but there is an exception for any radio communication "readily accessible to
the general public." FLA. STAT. § 934.02(12), .03(2)(h)(1) (1995).
70. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
71. Id. at 354 n.14.
72. Id. at 354.
73. Id. at 353.
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a telephone booth may rely upon the protection of the Fourth
Amendment.74
The Court noted that the interception would have been constitutional if
the agents had obtained a warrant.
7 5
When later courts have had to decide whether the interception of a
communication is constitutional, most have used the two-part test from
Justice Harlan's concurrence, which is as follows:
[T]here is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
"reasonable." Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy, but objects, activities, or statements that
he exposes to the "plain view" of outsiders are not "protected" be-
cause no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited. On
the other hand, conversations in the open would not be protected
against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the
circumstances would be unreasonable. 
76
Katz set forth the privacy framework in the context of search and
seizure and led to the passage of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968 [hereinafter the "1968 Act"]. The 1968 Act filled in the
Katz framework. The introductory language to Title HI of the 1968 Act
states:
In order to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral commu-
nications, to protect the integrity of court and administrative pro-
ceedings, and to prevent the obstruction of interstate commerce, it
is necessary for Congress to define on a uniform basis the circum-
stances and conditions under which the interception of wire and
oral communications may be authorized, to prohibit any unauthor-
ized interception of such communications, and the use of the con-
tents thereof in evidence in courts and administrative proceed-
ings.77
74. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
75. Katz, 389 U.S. at 354.
76. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
77. OMNIUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE STREETS Acr OF 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, § 82,
STAT. 197 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 237, 253.
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In passing the 1968 Act, Congress attempted to prevent the interception
of oral and wire communications without the consent of at least one party to
the communication. The Act required a court order to intercept a communi-
cation without the consent of any of the parties to the conversation.78
Evidence obtained from unauthorized interception was inadmissible in court.
The Act also provided criminal penalties for its violation and authorized
civil damages.79
The Federal Act generally protects wire, electronic, and oral communi-
cations from interception, and the communications, once intercepted, are
protected from being disclosed to others. 80 Wire and electronic communica-
tions are not protected if they are "readily accessible to the general public.'
Harlan's two part test from Katz also comprises part of the definition of an
"oral communication" under the Federal Act. Oral communications are
protected if "uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such commu-
nication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such
expectation.' 82 Two exceptions to the Federal Act83 allow a law enforce-
ment officer or informant participating in the conversation, and a private
party84 to the conversation to record the conversation. Absent the consent of
a participant, interception and disclosure may be done only after obtaining a
court order.85 Unlawfully intercepted communications are inadmissible,
8 6
and the person intercepting or disclosing the communications in violation of
the Federal Act may be subject to fine, imprisonment, and civil damages.87
In the Plachy murder-for-hire scheme outlined in Part II, the would be
hit man, Peter Laquerre, was working as an informant for the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement ("FDLE"), allowing the FDLE to tape
conversations between himself and Plachy.88 Informants are often used by
police to gather information. The informant meeting with a suspect is often
fitted with a "bug," located on the informant's person, which transmits the
78. Id. at 253.
79. Id. at 253-54.
80. Id. at 253.
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(g)(i) (1994).
82. Id. § 2510(2) (1994).
83. Id. § 2511(2)(c)-(d).
84. The private party exception applies "unless such communication is intercepted for the
purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act...." Id. § 2511 (2)(d).
85. Id. §§ 2516, 2517 (1994).
86. Id. § 2515 (1994).
87. Id. §§ 2511(4)-(5), 2520 (1994).
88. Wheaton & Silva, supra note 53, at A9.
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conversation between the suspect and the informant, to an officer located at
a distance. Under the Federal and Florida Act, an informant can intercept a
conversation.89 Although the constitutionality of the use of informants to
gather information has been questioned, the United States Supreme Court
has never held their use to be unconstitutional. 9°
The Federal Act preempted regulation of interception of communica-
tions by the states. Thus, the Florida Act must provide at least as much
protection against interception of communications as does the Federal Act.
In addition, the Florida Act can provide more protection against interception
of communications than does the Federal Act.91 In one major respect, the
Florida Act does provide more protection than the Federal Act. Florida
requires all participants to consent before a private party may tape a conver-
sation even though the Federal Act only requires one party consent.
IV. THE FLORIDA ACT
In many respects, the Florida Act closely follows the Federal Act. The
Florida Act also generally protects wire, electronic, and oral communications
from interception, and the communications, once intercepted, are protected
from being disclosed to others. Wire and electronic communications are not
protected if they are "readily accessible to the general public,"92 and oral
communications are protected if "uttered by a person exhibiting an expecta-
tion that such communication is not subject to interception under circum-
89. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c) provides:
It is lawful under ss. 934.03-934.09 for an investigative or law enforcement offi-
cer or a person acting under the direction of an investigative or law enforcement
officer to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication when such person is
a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has
given prior consent to such interception and the purpose of such interception is
to obtain evidence of a criminal act.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c) provides:
It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law
to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a
party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception.
90. United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745
(1971) (plurality decision), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 962 (1972); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
91. State v. Rivers, 660 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Fla. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1019
(1996).
92. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(h)(1).
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stances justifying such expectation., 93 Two exceptions to the Florida Act94
allow conversations to be recorded when either a law enforcement officer or
informant is participating in the conversation, or where a private party to the
conversation has obtained prior consent by the other parties involved in the
conversation.95 If a law enforcement officer or informant is a participant,
only the law enforcement officer or informant need consent. In contrast to
the Federal Act, the Florida Act requires all private parties to consent, if only
private parties are participants. Absent consent, interception and disclosure
may be done only after obtaining a court order.96 The Florida Act also
makes it unlawful "to intercept any communication for the purpose of
committing any criminal act. 97 Unlawfully intercepted communications are
inadmissible, 98 and the person intercepting or disclosing the communications
in violation of the Florida Act is guilty of a third degree felony punishable
by not more than five years imprisonment or a $5000 fine.99 The person may
also be subject to statutory damages of the greater of $100 per day or
$10,000 in punitive damages, reasonable attorneys' fees, and court costs.1°°
The Florida Act contains a good faith defense not included in the Federal
Act:
(2) A good faith reliance on:
(b) A good faith determination that federal or Florida law per-
mitted the conduct complained of shall constitute a complete de-
fense to any civil or criminal, or administrative action arising out of
such conduct under the laws of this state.1 1
93. Id § 934.02(2).
94. Id. § 934.03(2)(c)-(d). For the content of subsection (2)(c), see supra text accompa-
nying note 89. Section 934.03(2)(d) provides:
It is lawful under §§ 934.03-934.09 for a person to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication when all of the parties to the communication have
given prior consent to such interception.
FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d).
95. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(c).
96. Id. §§ 934.07-.08 (1995).
97. Id. § 934.03(2)(e).
98. Id § 934.06.
99. Id. §§ 775.082(3)(d), .083(1)(c) (1995), 934.03(4)(a).
100. FLA. STAT. § 934.10(1) (1995).
101. Id. § 934.10(2)(b). Although effective October 1, 1989, the ambiguous wording of
the good faith exception has received only very slight attention. Only two reported cases have
referenced the good faith exception. Wood v. State, 654 So. 2d 218 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
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This article opened with the facts from Inciarrano, a case in which the
murder victim taped his own murder. Prior to Inciarrano, the admissibility
of surreptitious tapings had been the subject of State v. Walls,1°2 an extortion
case, and State v. Tsavaris,1°3 a murder case. The taping in those cases
would have been admissible under the Federal Act because one of the
participants consented to the taping. In Walls and Tsavaris, the Supreme
Court of Florida applied the plain language of the Florida Act and held that
the tapings were inadmissible. This portion of the article will first review
Walls and Tsavaris and will examine how the Florida courts dealt with
Inciarrano.
A. State v. Walls
In Walls, Harold Walls and Stanley Gerstenfeld had been charged with
extortion.1 4 Walls and Gerstenfeld allegedly threatened Francis Antel in
Antel's home on February 19, 1975. Antel had recorded the conversation
between himself and the two suspects. Although Antel was ready to testify
as to the contents of the conversation at trial, the State wanted to introduce
the taping to bolster Antel's testimony.'05 The Supreme Court of Florida
ruled the applicable portions of the Security of Communications Act consti-
tutional and affirmed the trial court's order suppressing the tape.) 6
1995); Reliance Ins. Co. v. Lazzara Oil Co., 601 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
The Reliance court noted that the exception was not applicable because the alleged recordings
were made before the effective date of the exception. Reliance, 601 So. 2d at 1242 n.1. In
Wood, Kevin Earl Wood had previously been involved in a federal lawsuit, and a state divorce
and custody case and had taped two conversations in connection with those cases. Wood, 654
So. 2d at 219. He was later convicted of unlawful interception of communications. Id. At his
trial, he attempted to introduce a good faith defense under section 934.10(2)(b) of the Florida
Statutes. The trial court refused to allow testimony on the good faith defense, but the defense
was allowed to proffer certain information. The proffer showed that, unable to initially afford
an attorney, Wood researched case law and spoke with people involved in amending the
Florida Act to include the good faith exception. When Wood finally obtained an attorney, the
attorney "agreed with his interpretation of the Florida wire-tapping law, which was that if a
federal law permitted the activity in question, the state law did so also." Id. On appeal, the
court reversed and remanded for a new trial to allow evidence as to whether Wood "acted in
good-faith reliance on a good-faith determination." Id. at 220.
Does the good faith exception in effect amend the Florida Act to allow a private party
participant to record a conversation if the party has first obtained a legal opinion from an
attorney?
102. 356 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1978).
103. 394 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), review denied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
104. Walls, 356 So. 2d at 295.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 297.
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The language of the statutes in question is clear and unambiguous,
and no exception for the situation we have before us is provided.
This Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature
and create an exception which would encompass the instant cir-
cumstances.... The function of this Court is to interpret the law
and is neither to legislate nor determine the wisdom of the policy
of the Legislature.10 7
B. Tsavaris v. Scruggs
In Tsavaris, Dr. Louis J. Tsavaris, a psychiatrist, was charged with the
first degree murder of one of his patients and his alleged lover, Cassandra
Burton.108 On April 19, 1975, Dr. Tsavaris called an ambulance to Burton's
apartment. Burton was already dead when the ambulance arrived. Initially,
Dr. Tsavaris suggested that Burton had died of a drug overdose and empha-
sized that he and Burton were no more than patient and psychiatrist.10 9
The next day, however, a friend of Miss Burton told a sheriffs
deputy that Miss Burton and Dr. Tsavaris had been having an af-
fair; that she had become pregnant; and that she had undergone an
abortion only four weeks earlier. According to the deputy's infor-
mant, Miss Burton had not wanted the abortion, but Dr. Tsavaris
insisted; the couple's relationship was a stormy one, and they had
recently quarreled over Miss Burton's demand that Tsavaris obtain
a divorce in order to marry her.
110
On Sunday, April 20, 1975, Detective Poindexter of the Hillsborough
County Sheriffs Department was conferring with Dr. Feegel at the morgue.
Feegel was the forensic pathologist who was performing Burton's autopsy.
Poindexter had told Feegel about the alleged relationship between Tsavaris
and Burton, and Burton's abortion. Dr. Tsavaris called for the autopsy
results and Feegel took the call on speaker phone. After Dr. Tsavaris
identified himself, Feegel and Poindexter exchanged glances and Feegel
turned on a tape recorder, which would pick up sounds in the room. When
Feegel explained that he did not have the results of the autopsy, Tsavaris
asked if he could call back and Feegel suggested Tsavaris call at 1:30.
107. Id. at 296 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
108. Tsavaris v. Scruggs, 360 So. 2d 745, 747 (Fla. 1977).
109. Id. at 747-48.
110. Id. at 748.
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Tsavaris called two more times that day, and each time the sheriff's officers
recorded the conversations.111 Dr. John Feegel testified at trial that Burton
died from manual strangulation.
Although he found no bruises or other evidence of strangulation on
the skin of the neck, he stated that a strangulation can occur with-
out leaving marks on the neck.
Feegel apprised the court and jury of a technique of reducing
the blood flow to the brain to enhance pleasure during a sexual ex-
perience. This technique ... involves partial strangulation. The
technique is also used by cardiologists to change or stop heart
rhythm. It is a dangerous procedure to be used only under con-
trolled conditions, since the loss of oxygen to the brain (which is
what increases sexual enjoyment) can lead to unconsciousness, and
heart stoppage can also occur. There [is] some indication that
[Tsavaris] was familiar with this technique, and there was testi-
mony that he had once said he knew how to strangle a person with-
out leaving marks. And there was evidence found by Feegel that
Burton had engaged in sexual activity shortly before her death.112
While the autopsy was in progress, Dr. Tsavaris called the
morgue to inquire about the results of the autopsy and reiterated his
claim that he only knew the deceased professionally. He was told
to call back later. When Dr. Tsavaris called the second time, he
was told that the autopsy was not complete but that the pathologist
had concluded that an abortion had recently been performed. He
denied having any knowledge of the abortion. By the time a third
telephone call came from Dr. Tsavaris, the medical examiners had
satisfied themselves that Miss Burton's death was caused by stran-
gulation. This was kept from Dr. Tsavaris, however, who was told
instead that the official report might be inconclusive because no
cause of death had been discovered. At this point, the person at the
other end of the line said, he "could tell the change in Tsavaris'
voice. I could sense the relief."113
111. State v. Tsavaris, 382 So. 2d 56, 60 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980), review denied,
424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
112. Tsavaris v. State, 414 So. 2d 1087, 1088 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review de-
nied, 424 So. 2d 763 (Fla. 1983).
113. Tsavaris, 360 So. 2d at 748.
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The trial judge suppressed Feegel's tape. 1 4 The Second District Court
of Appeals affirmed and certified the following question to the Supreme
Court of Florida: "[d]oes the recording of a conversation by one of the
participants constitute the interception of a wire or oral communication
within the meaning of chapter 934 Florida Statutes (1979). ' 15 The Supreme
Court of Florida held that the recording was made in violation of the Florida
statute requiring all parties to consent to the recording of a conversation. 1 6
In reaching its decision, the court noted that the Florida statute had been
amended in 1974 to require consent of all parties prior to an interception." 7
On the floor of the Florida House of Representatives, the only re-
corded debate on the two-party consent requirement of section
934.03(2)(d) was this comment by Representative Shreve:
'[What this bill does] is to prevent, make it illegal, for a
person to record a conversation, even though he's a party
to it, without the other person's consent.'
With no further debate, the bill passed the House 109-1. 118
The court rejected the district court's interpretation of "interception" to
mean an interception by wiretap of the conversation before reaching the
intended recipient." 19 Justice Alderman, concurring in part and dissenting in
part, would have accepted the district court's interpretation of
"interception."' 20 He also noted the seriousness of the offense of intercep-
tion of communications to which Antel and Feegel could be subject, consid-
ering that the tapings were evidence of extortion and murder. 12
1
I cannot believe that the legislature intended to brand as a
third-degree felon the victim of extortionary threats, who, while in
his home, electronically records the threats made against him. E.g.
State v. Walls. Likewise, I do not believe the legislature intended
that a public-spirited citizen like Dr. Feegel, who, in the course of
114. State v. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d 418,420 (Fla. 1981).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 427.
117. Id. at 422.
118. Id. (citations omitted).
119. Tsavaris, 394 So. 2d at 422.
120. Id. at 430 (Alderman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
121. Id. at 432.
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his employment as medical examiner, records a lawfully received
telephone communication relevant to a pending murder investiga-
tion, should be subjected to the possibility of criminal prosecu-
tion....
The majority says that the legislature intended that for this public-
spirited action Dr. Feegel is guilty of a third-degree felony. Surely,
the legislature did not intend such an absurd result.'22
C. State v. Inciarrano
The trial judge denied Inciarrano's motion to suppress.'23 Inciarrano
pleaded no contest and appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. On
appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, feeling constrained by the plain
wording of the statutes and prior case law, reversed. 24 The Supreme Court
of Florida then had to decide whether to create a case law exception to the
Florida statutes or to let a cold-blooded murderer go free. The court phrased
the issue as "whether the tape recording made by a victim of his own murder
must be excluded from evidence pursuant to chapter 934,"125 and held "that
under the circumstances of this case the subject tape recording does not fall
within the statutory proscription of chapter 934." 126 The court concluded
that the statutes did not apply because Inciarrano had no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.' 27 This conclusion was unsupported by any analysis to offer
guidance in future cases.1
2
122. Id.
123. The definition of "oral communication" is "any oral communication uttered by a
person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation." FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1995). In reaching its
decision, the trial court noted "the quasi-public nature of the premises within which the
conversations occurred, the physical proximity and accessibility of the premises to bystanders,
and the location and visibility to the unaided eye of the microphone used to record the
conversations." State v. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d 1272, 1274 (Fla. 1985).
124. Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1984), quashed by
473 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1985).
125. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1273.
126. Id. at 1274.
127. Id. at 1276.
128. Id. at 1275. Four Supreme Court of Florida Justices joined in the opinion and three
concurred, two joining in one concurrence and one authoring another concurrence. Id. at
1276.
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Inciarrano went to the victim's office with the intent to do him
harm. He did not go as a patient. The district court, in the present
case, correctly stated:
One who enters the business premises of another for a
lawful purpose is an invitee. At the moment that his in-
tention changes, that is, if he suddenly decides to steal or
pillage, or murder, or rape, then at that moment he be-
comes a trespasser and has no further right upon the
premises. Thus, here, if appellant ever had a privilege, it
dissolved in the sound of gunfire.
129
Accordingly, we hold that because Inciarrano had no reasonable
expectation of privacy, the exclusionary rule of section 934.06 does
not apply.
130
The two concurrences "flesh out" the majority opinion, though in quite
different ways. Justice Overton wrote:
I concur and write to emphasize that when an individual enters
someone else's home or business, he has no expectation of privacy
in what he says or does there, and chapter 934 does not apply. It is
a different question, however, when the individual whose conver-
sation is being recorded is in his own home or office. 131
In his concurrence, Justice Ehrlich is much more critical of the majority's
reasoning:
Privacy rights attach to individuals, not to actions ... , [T]o hold,
as the majority does, that the commission of a criminal act waives a
privacy right requires an entirely new legal definition of privacy
rights which would, in turn, shake the foundation of fourth amend-
ment analysis.... It would be more judicially honest to admit the
error and recede from Walls and Tsavaris and to hold that the stat-
ute is inapplicable. The victim no more "intercepted" the conver-
sation than he "intercepted" the bullets that ended his life....
129. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d at 1275-76 (citing Inciarrano v. State, 447 So. 2d at 389).
130. Md at 1276.
131. Id. (Overton, J., concurring).
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If criminal acts waive privacy rights, as the majority implies,
police have the right and duty to intrude without a warrant into a
bedroom where the owner/resident is smoking marijuana, reasoning
that the fourth amendment protection has "gone up in smoke."' 32
What Justice Ehrlich seems to suggest is that Florida interprets its statute as
requiring "all of the parties to the communication [to] have given prior
consent to such interception,"' 133 in order to allow a participant to a conver-
sation to lawfully record the conversation.
D. State v. Walls, Tsavaris v. Scruggs, and State v. Inciarrano
Inciarrano was a very difficult case for the Supreme Court of Florida.
If the court applied the plain language of the statute, then the tape recording
of Inciarrano murdering Trimble would have been inadmissible. The
available evidence was much different in Inciarrano than in Walls and
Tsavaris. In Walls and Tsavaris, at least one party to the conversation, other
than the defendant, could testify, and in Tsavaris, there was documentary
and medical evidence. There was no other evidence in Inciarrano to tie
Inciarrano to Trimble's murder except for the tape recording. Inciarrano
admitted it was his voice on the tape. Faced with a difficult decision, the
Supreme Court of Florida created a case law exception to the plainly worded
Florida statute. The Inciarrano majority decided that the tape was admissi-
ble because Inciarrano had no expectation of privacy. True, the Florida
statute, like the Federal Act, defines an "oral communication" as a conversa-
tion in which the participants have a justified expectation of privacy. But
why did Inciarrano have no expectation of privacy? Was it because he was
committing a crime, or was it because of the physical surroundings-that
Inciarrano and Trimble were in an office, subject to being interrupted at any
time, or was it because it was Trimble's office? The court never adequately
explained its rationale for deciding that Trimble had no expectation of
privacy.
E. People, Not Places
Katz v. United States134 changed prior search and seizure law to protect
people, not places. The Supreme Court of Florida, with little analysis, has
ruled that a suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy recognized by
132. Id at 1277 (Ehrlich, J., concurring).
133. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(d) (1995).
134. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See discussion supra pp. 444-50.
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society in the suspect's home (Mozo), 135 but not in a private office
(Inciarrano).136 Contrary to Katz, the court seems to be protecting places,
not people. The Florida Act should be interpreted consistently with Katz to
make a person's privacy depend on the person's reasonable expectation of
privacy, as recognized by society, and not on the person's location. In
interpreting the Florida Act, the Florida courts have considered conversa-
tions originating in a variety of locations. These locations range from the
home (Wall and Mozo), to the office (Inciarrano), to the patrol car
(Smith),137 to the jail. The First District Court of Appeal of Florida created a
case law exception to the Florida Security of Communications Act to allow a
prison guard to monitor an inmate's outgoing call. 138 In Katz, the United
States Supreme Court recognized an expectation of privacy in a glass
paneled telephone booth and, in dicta, said that an expectation of privacy
could apply to other locations such as "in a business office, in a friend's
apartment, or in a taxicab."'' 39 In Mozo, the Florida Supreme Court recog-
nized that the Mozos had an expectation of privacy to talk on a cordless
phone in their own apartment without being intercepted.' 4° Inciarrano had
no expectation of privacy in Trimble's office, nor did Smith in a patrol car,
nor did prisoners in jail, except perhaps if a prisoner had recently invoked
his right to an attorney.1 41  If Floridians have any expectation of privacy,
135. See infra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
138. In Pires v. Wainwright, 419 So. 2d 358, 359 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), a guard
monitored Pires' telephone call to someone outside the prison. Pires, an inmate at Union
Correctional Institute, was calling to arrange an escape and was disciplined because of the
information learned by the monitoring officer. The court found that society's interest in
prison security outweighed Pires' expectation of privacy and created a case law exception to
the Florida Security of Communications Act. Id. at 359. "[W]e hold there is an exception to
the Security of Communications Act permitting prison officials to wiretap telephone calls
from prisoners incarcerated in our prisons." Id.
139. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (citations omitted).
140. State v. Mozo, 655 So. 2d 1115, 1117 (Fla. 1995).
141. In State v. Calhoun, 479 So. 2d 241, 242-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1985), David
and McCall Calhoun, brothers, were in jail. When the brothers were placed in an interview
room, the officers monitored their conversation. When McCall was removed, an officer again
gave David his Miranda rights and David requested his public defender. Upon denying David
his request, McCall was placed back in the interview room with David. The officers both
video and audio taped their fifteen minute conversation. The court held that the videotape
should have been excluded. Id. at 245. The court based its decision on sections 12 and 23 of
article I of the Florida Constitution, the Florida Security of Communications Act, David's
Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and his Sixth Amendment right to an attorney. Id.
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which will be recognized by the Supreme Court of Florida, it is apparently
only in one's own home.
Thus far, Florida courts have not recognized that it is possible to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a location other than one's home.
Apparently, the conversation between Inciarrano and Trimble was private.
A neighbor did hear gunshots, but no one heard the sound of their voices nor
saw Inciarrano enter or exit Trimble's office. Even ruling that Inciarrano
had no expectation of privacy because he was in Trimble's office and not in
his own office, is contrary to Katz. If Trimble had gone to Inciarrano's
office instead, but still had recorded his own murder, the court probably
would have ruled that Inciarrano had no expectation of privacy because it
was an office and not a home. The real problem with Inciarrano is that it
was such a difficult case because of the two party consent requirement of the
Florida Act.
V. FLORIDA-CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY PROVISIONS
This section examines the two privacy provisions of the Florida
Constitution and their applicability to protecting communications. Article I,
section 12 of the Florida Constitution, Florida's search and seizure provi-
sion, prohibits "unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means" and article I, section 23, contains an explicit right to privacy. 42 In
1968, article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution provided:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, and against
the unreasonable interception of private communications by any
means, shall not be violated. No warrant shall be issued except
upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, particularly describ-
ing the place or places to be searched, the person or persons, thing
A jailhouse conversation may be overheard if a suspect's voice is so loud that it carries
through a closed door. Taylor v. State, 292 So. 2d 375, 376 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), cert.
denied, 298 So. 2d 415 (Fla. 1974). Taylor was in a line up room being used as a conference
room when he said in a loud voice: "[t]hat mother ... couldn't identify me; I had a stocking
over my face." Id. at 376. Two officers heard the statement through the closed door. The
trial court had allowed testimony about the statement into evidence and the appellate court
affirmed, ruling that overhearing the statement was not in violation of the Florida Security of
Communications Act. Id. at 377.
142. Joseph W. Little & Steven E. Lohr, Textual History of the Florida Declaration of
Rights, 22 STETSON L. REV. 549, 629 (1993).
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or things to be seized, the communication to be intercepted, and the
nature of evidence to be obtained.
143
In 1980, article I, section 23, was added to the Florida Constitution.1 44
Article I, section 23 provides:
Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from
governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise
provided herein. This section shall not be construed to limit the
public's right of access to public records and meetings as provided
by law.
145
In State v. Sarmiento,146 a Supreme Court of Florida landmark decision,
the issue before the court was "whether the warrantless, electronic intercep-
tion by state agents of a conversation between defendant and an undercover
police officer in defendant's home is an unreasonable interception of
defendant's private communications in violation of article I, section 12,
Florida Constitution."'147 The court concluded that the interception was
unreasonable, even though section 934.03(2)(c) allowed interception by a
law enforcement officer or informant. 148 "Our response to this contention is
simple; insofar as that statute authorizes the warrantless interception of a
private conversation conducted in the home, it is unconstitutional and
unenforceable."'149 Thus, the court interpreted the Florida Constitution to
provide more protection than the United States Constitution.
Although subsequent decisions limited Sarmiento's ban on the use of
informants to the home, 150 article I, section 12, was amended in 1982,'1' to
143. Id. at 629.
144. Id. at 635 (citations omitted).
145. Id.
146. 397 So. 2d 643 (Fla. 1981).
147. Id. at 644.
148. Id. at 645.
149. Id.
150. The right of privacy does not extend to one's private business office. For similar
cases involving failure to extend the right of privacy, see, eg., Morningstar v. State, 428 So. 2d
220 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983) (discussing privacy in a private business
office); Zacke v. State, 418 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982), review denied, 426 So.
2d 29 (Fla. 1983) (discussing privacy in a suspect's back yard); State v. Vanyo, 417 So. 2d
1104 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing privacy in a parking lot); Ruiz v. State, 416
So. 2d 32 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing privacy in a motel room); Miller v. State,
411 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 419 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 1982)
(discussing privacy in a suspect's truck); Hurst v. State, 409 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
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do away with Sarmiento by appending the following two sentences to the
end of the provision:
This right shall be construed in conformity with the 4th Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United
States Supreme Court. Articles or information obtained in viola-
tion of this right shall not be admissible in evidence if such articles
or information would be inadmissible under decisions of the United
States Supreme Court construing the 4th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. 15
Thus, after the effective date of the amendment, an informant or police
officer would be able to tape a conversation, even if the conversation
occurred in the suspect's home.
A suspect arguing that an intercepted communication should be sup-
pressed would have no better luck relying on article I, section 23, than
relying on article I, section 12. The Supreme Court of Florida has held that
article I, section 23, does not expand the protection afforded a suspect in the
search and seizure context. "[O]ur right of privacy provision, article I,
section 23, does not modify the applicability of article I, section 12, particu-
larly since section 23 was adopted prior to the present section 12."153 The
decision thus limits the protection of article I, section 23, against government
intrusion to situations other than those involving search and seizure.
Since Sarmiento, the Supreme Court of Florida has been loath to protect
communications under either of the Florida Constitution's privacy provi-
sions. This is so even though either or both of the provisions arguably could
provide more protection than the Florida Act. In an April 1995 cordless
telephone case, Mozo,' 54 the court used convoluted reasoning to base its
holding on the Florida Act rather than on sections 12 or 23 of article I of the
Florida Constitution, as had the lower court. "[W]e adhere to the settled
App. 1982) (discussing privacy in an informant's home); Chiarenza v. State, 406 So. 2d 66
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), review denied, 413 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1982) (discussing privacy
in a motel room); Padgett v. State, 404 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (discussing
privacy in a restaurant, a truck, and an outdoor setting); Pittman v. State, 397 So. 2d 1205
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 407 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 1981). The right of privacy did
extend to the suspect's apartment. Copeland v. State, 435 So. 2d 842 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (application of amendment to article I, section 12, prospective in effect), review denied,
443 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 1983).
151. Little & Lohr, supra note 142, at 629.
152. Id.
153. State v. Jimeno, 588 So. 2d 233, 233 (Fla. 1991).
154. 655 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 1995).
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principle of constitutional law that courts should endeavor to implement the
legislative intent of statutes and avoid constitutional issues."1 55
Mozo involved the following facts. In 1991, in Plantation, Florida,
police detectives were using a scanner to intercept cordless telephone calls
near an apartment complex. When they picked up a suspicious conversation,
they continued to monitor the same radio frequency and taped calls. They
obtained a search warrant for the Mozos' apartment in the complex based on
the intercepted information and the unusual amount of activity observed at
the apartment. The Mozos were arrested after drugs and drug paraphernalia
were found in the search. When their motion to suppress was denied, they
pled nolo contendere, reserving their right to appeal the denial of their
motion to suppress.156 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida held that
"oral communications conducted over a cordless phone within the privacy of
one's own home are protected by Florida's Security of Communications
Act" because the Mozos had a reasonable expectation of privacy that
cordless telephone calls originating in their home would not be inter-
cepted. 57 "Oral communication" in the Florida Act is defined as:
any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expecta-
tion that such communication is not subject to interception under
circumstances justifying such expectation and does not mean any
public oral communication uttered at a public meeting or any elec-
tronic communication.
58
Two concurring justices would have based the decision on article I, section
23 of the Florida Constitution, rather than the Florida Act. They noted that
the definition of an "electronic communication" in the Florida Act specifi-
cally excludes "[t]he radio portion of a cordless telephone communication
that is transmitted between the cordless telephone handset and the base
unit.,,
159
[B]ecause cordless telephone communications are expressly ex-
cluded from the definition of electronic communications, it makes
little sense to construe the definition of oral communications as in-
cluding cordless telephone communications. Further, the Florida
155. Id. at 1117.
156. Id. at 1116.
157. Id. at 1117.
158. FLA. STAT. § 934.02(2) (1995).
159. Id. § 934.02(12)(a).
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Act was patterned after federal legislation, and it is clear from the
legislative history that Congress intended to exclude cordless tele-
phone communications from the purview of the federal Act. 160
It seems more appropriate to base the decision on an available constitutional
provision, as the concurring justices would have, than on tortured language
of the Florida Act.
Aside from the lack of a sound statutory basis for its decision, Mozo
provides little guidance for future decisions involving cordless telephones.
The court ruled that the interception of the cordless telephone conversation
occurred where it "originated" and that the Mozos had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in their own home. 61 The court again seems to be protecting
places, not people, which is contrary to Katz. The other problem was in the
ruling that the conversations originated in the Mozos' home. Although the
court did not explain why this was so, the conversations apparently origi-
nated in the Mozos' home because that was the end of the conversation in
which the officers were interested. What if the other party had called the
Mozos first? What if the other end of the conversation was not in a home?
If the officers had intercepted what the Mozos were saying by accident, only
after conducting surveillance of an alleged drug buyer calling from a pay
phone, would the Mozos' conversations still be protected?
VI. Two-PARTY CONSENT
The Florida Act should be amended to allow taping upon the consent of
one party to the conversation. The Florida Act two-party consent require-
ment has caused the Florida courts to legislate in difficult cases. In Walls,
the Supreme Court of Florida emphatically declared that it should not
legislate.1 62 Even so, it and the lower courts have done so in hard cases like
Inciarrano. The Inciarrano court ruled that, since Inciarrano was in Trim-
ble's office, Inciarrano had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 63 As
explained in this portion of the article, the reasons for allowing taping on the
consent of one participant far outweigh the reasons for requiring all partici-
pants to consent.
160. Mozo, 655 So. 2d at 1117 (Grimes, C.J., concurring).
161. I
162. Walls, 356 So. 2d at 296.
163. Inciarrano, 473 So. 2d. at 1275-76.
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The principle arguments supporting two party consent are that surrepti-
tious taping will have a chilling effect on conversation and that it is unfair.
Those who focus on the chilling effect emphasize that surreptitious taping
will make people feel that they cannot say what they really mean, let off
steam, complain, tell jokes, or criticize without running afoul of the "thought
police." "Big brother" will be monitoring what you say and you will be
punished if your speech is not politically correct. Another facet of the
argument is that taping without the other person's consent is ethically and
morally wrong. There must be some devious purpose if one has to tape
without receiving the other party's consent. Why can't you just ask for
consent if you want to gather information or have the taping serve as a
memory aid? One discovering later that the conversation has been taped will
regard the taping as a betrayal of confidence.
There are many legitimate reasons for allowing one participant to tape.
Examples include aiding one's memory, having an accurate record, gathering
information of a crime or tort, and defending oneself. After all, how else
could you protect yourself against charges such as sexual harassment or
employment discrimination? It is irrational to allow someone to testify
about a conversation but not allow a tape recording of the same conversation
to be admitted into evidence. A tape recording is much more accurate than
someone testifying as to that person's recollection of what happened because
it captures statements in context. In addition, a tape may be vital where the
testimony of witnesses is so conflicting that you know someone is lying.
What would have happened if Clarence Thomas or Anita Hill had taped their
conversations?
The statute requiring two party consent follows someone's perceived
idea of morality and sweeps too broadly, potentially capturing public-minded
citizens like Antel and Feegel within its grasp. The ambiguous "good faith"
defense is not enough to protect the person with a legitimate reason to tape.
Wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes are the only "search and seizure"
proscription against private action. Otherwise, state action has to be in-
volved to have evidence excluded. Criminals like Walls, Tsavaris, and
Inciarrano are the ones to benefit if the plain language of the Florida Act is
followed. Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano could have sued Antel, Feegel,
and Trimble's estate for civil damages, and Walls and Tsavaris could have
pressed for third degree felony charges. Public figures, and people such as
Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano, who have the right to be distrustful that a
confidence will be betrayed, are the ones who will be more careful anyway
and will perhaps guard themselves against surreptitious interception.
Otherwise, if there is nothing illegal taking place, the likelihood of someone
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taping a private conversation is small. It is usually too cumbersome to set up
a taping and it is too difficult to infiltrate a group and gain the group's
confidence. The risk that someone will tape is approximately the same or
less than the risk that the party will divulge the contents of a confidential
conversation.
In Florida, the private party who tapes a conversation is likely to be
punished much more severely than a police officer or an informant. A police
officer is allowed to tape a conversation and to have the conversation
admitted into evidence if the police officer is a party to the conversation or
an informant/participant has consented to the taping.'64 In contrast, a private
party is prohibited from taping without all participants' consent, and a
conversation taped with only one party consent is inadmissible. This, in
effect, sanctions the entrance of big brother into the conversation, but allows
someone taping a conversation for innocent reasons to be prosecuted for the
taping.
Some people foolishly trust the other party to the conversation not to
record the conversation, and they have the unpleasant surprise later of
learning that the conversation was recorded. Other people, who may or may
not have something to hide, are shrewd enough to know that things that are
not said cannot be taped. In 1990, in California, a daughter testified from
her repressed memory that years before she had seen her father murder her
best friend, then eight. The father was tried and convicted.16 Before trial,
the daughter went to visit the father in prison. In the prison visitation room,
the daughter asked the father to admit he had murdered her friend.1 66 The
father pointed to the sign on the wall, "Conversations May Be Monitored"
and refused to answer.1 67 At trial, the daughter was allowed to testify about
her father's refusal to answer. On April 4, 1995, a federal judge ruled that
the conviction could not stand. 168 One of the errors ruled reversible by the
judge was the admittance into evidence of comments on the father's refusal
to answer the daughter's question.
169
Why single out audio taping for statutory protection and not also protect
against videotaping? There are certain situations in which videotaping is
164. FLA. STAT. § 934.03(2)(a)(3)(c) (1995).
165. Franklin v. Duncan, 884 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (N.D. Cal.), aft'd, 70 F.3d 75 (9th Cir.
1995).
166. Tamar Lewin, Judge Upsets Murder Conviction Focused on 'Repressed Memory,'
N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 5, 1995, at Al8.
167. Franklin, 884 F. Supp. at 1445.
168. Lewin, supra note 166, at A18.
169. Id.
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more invidious than audio taping. Scott Bentley's taping of consensual
sexual activity was prosecuted criminally, whereas a videotaping of the same
event may not have had attendant criminal charges. If the reason for the
taping is one's prurient interest, a videotaping of a romantic episode may be
much worse than the audio tape. The section of Part II of this article entitled
"To Entertain or to Satisfy One's Prurient Interest" contains a number of
"revealing" incidents which were taped or videotaped. Although an audio-
tape of the incidents was certainly an invasion of privacy, a videotaped
picture of the incidents would be an even more serious invasion of privacy.
Does the all party consent requirement coincide with the public's
expectations? Many individuals in all party consent states may not realize
the state has such a requirement. Thus, they may inadvertently subject
themselves to being prosecuted and to being sued civilly. For most other
crimes with similarly severe punishment, there is at least a feeling that the
action is wrong. In contrast, participant taping of a conversation may be
entirely innocent. People's idea of morality is changing. Surreptitious
taping is not perceived by many to be wrong. This is the electronic age.
Like Scott Bentley, most people would not imagine that clicking on a tape
recorder without asking the other person for consent would be illegal. For
an action that many people do not realize is illegal, the punishment is severe.
Disclosure of taped material is also illegal and carries the same penalties.
Thus, Gennifer Flowers may have legally recorded her conversations with
President Clinton, but she could face criminal charges if she sold her tapes in
Florida.
Why does Florida need interception of communications dealt with both
criminally and civilly? Most "bad" interception is already dealt with in other
criminal statutes, or there is a tort action available. For example, an individ-
ual may be charged with blackmail or sued for invasion of privacy. The
Florida Act forces the courts to legislate in the difficult cases. Because it is
very difficult to draw the line between legitimate and illegitimate reasons for
taping, it would be almost impossible to draft an appropriate statute.
VII. CONCLUSION
The two-party consent requirement is irrational and the statute should
be amended to eliminate it. The rationale supporting the two-party consent
requirement is far outstripped by the reasons, detailed above, for eliminating
it. In Florida, it is a third degree felony for a private party to tape a conver-
sation unless all participants consent. Any tape made without the consent of
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all participants is inadmissible and a nonconsenting party can recover civil
damages from the person who taped the conversation.
Presumably, all parties are required to consent because surreptitious
taping may be considered unfair. Another reason given is that allowing
surreptitious taping may have a chilling effect on conversation. The broad
sweep of the two party consent requirement has caught up many unsuspect-
ing, otherwise-innocent people within its grasp. The requirement forecloses
taping for legitimate reasons such as gathering information (possibly to later
defend oneself) and gathering evidence of a tort or crime.
In contrast, criminals, like Walls, Tsavaris, and Inciarrano, stand to
benefit from it. Inciarrano is an example of a difficult case, in which the
application of the two-party consent requirement could have allowed the
only evidence of a murder to be suppressed. Thus, a court faced with a
similarly difficult case would probably enlarge the case law exception
created by Inciarrano.
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